|Category: Technical Papers|
|Technical Papers||Files: 20|
|2017 - March - Moore - Signalling system safety is NOT an absolute|
Trevor Moore Hon FIRSE FIEA Aust
Australian Rail Track Corporation
We often design a signalling system and continue its operation even though there are significant changes in train operating conditions. Do we assume that is still as safe as the day it was commissioned into service?
Some cases are self-evident that safety has changed. If we increase the train speed over a level crossing we know that the approach warnings have to be reviewed and updated. Do we check and update if they have changed the road traffic classification to B double trucks?
When and how should we review the signalling system for safety of operations? What should be the catalyst to undertaking a review? Should this be part of the standard practice for signal engineers managing infrastructure and for signal designers on new works?
|2017 - March - McDonald - Is RAMS all BULL for Electromechanical Equipment?|
Wayne McDonald BE (Elec) FIRSE
Railways are required to operate safely and one of the methods to demonstrate this is type approval of signalling equipment. That approval must include documentation of high RAMS (Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety) when applied in vital and even non-vital applications. Suppliers have provided such values, in some form or another, for electrical, electronic and programmable electronic equipment for many years. The limitations and applicability of these values have not always been well understood and they have often been misapplied. The decisions for product comparison or maintenance plans could therefore be compromised or invalid.
More recently, purchasers, and personnel assessing type approval are demanding values such as SIL (Safety Integrity Level) and MTBF (Mean Time Between Failure) for electromechanical equipment and systems. The standards currently used for programmable electronic systems clearly state that using them to derive values for electromechanical is inappropriate.
This paper delves into the importance of understanding and applying meaningful RAMS values for signalling equipment and addresses the inappropriateness of SIL and MTBF for Electromechanical Equipment. It continues to offer some suggestions for how RAMS can be used for Electromechanical Equipment.
|2017 - March - Leveque - Advanced features over ETCS for suburban railway operation|
Dr Olivier Leveque
Alstom Signalling – Australia New Zealand
The advanced features over ETCS detailed in this paper are Virtual Block Sectioning and scalable Automatic Train Operation. These features can be incrementally implemented to meet the current and future business requirements of a suburban railway operation. A case study is presented to illustrate the performance benefits of a scalable ATO overlaid onto an ETCS solution for a suburban application.
|2017 - March - Gillespie - Are CAD drawings the best way to design signalling systems|
Rob Gillespie NTD Elec Eng.
I&E Systems Pty Ltd
Modern railway signalling systems now incorporate computer-based interlocking, and the wiring is predominantly simple input/output functions, so, is CAD really the best way to design these high integrity systems?
|2017 - March - D'Cruz - Do we have the backbone to support emerging technologies?|
Malcolm D’Cruz M.E. Mechatronics
Public Transport Authority of Western Australia
David Lim MSc. Telecommunication Management
UXC Ltd – A CSC Company
Railways are always increasing the number of network services to cope with emerging technologies. The success of Communication Based Train Control (CBTC) depends on the ability of the backbone communication system to guarantee high bandwidths and reliability. Thus the traditional railway communication network is gradually moving towards a carrier grade network servicing both internal as well as external clients.
The aim of this paper is to show how Software Defined Networks (SDN) adopted by telecom service providers as a common platform for all network services can benefit the railway networking environment to cope with constantly emerging technologies.
|2017 - March - Boshier - Technology based asset management|
Steve Boshier FIRSE, FCILTA
Asset Management is an area that continues to develop through innovation, technical developments and through new ways of looking at whole of life management. In tough economic times, businesses often take short cuts with asset management in a bid to remain profitable. Its usually one of the first areas whose budget gets cut back for a whole range of reasons. Such a decision only provides a short term solution to a problem that ultimately gets worse and comes back to bite even greater.
Technologies such as BIM, Mobility, Analytics, and a suite of ISO standards represents a coming of age for rail systems asset management. They are transforming the rail sector and are helping to drive a long term approach to maintenance with benefits. One that is now allowing staff to do more with less whilst allowing them to improve the asset reliability, availability and system safety.
|2017 - July - Wimberley - Cyber Security in a Heavy Haul Railway|
Jeff Wimberley BE, Associate Member IRSE
Aurizon PTY LTD
As technology changes, modern railway signalling systems are becoming more and more reliant on IP Data networks for both their day to day operation as well as for their supportability. For example we now have processor based interlockings at one end of a yard being connected to object controllers at the other end of the yard using IP based data networks. We also have a need to remotely access interlockings and associated systems such as axle counters as well as the data network elements from a central location or a location remote to the organisation to monitor and maintain service of these systems. Whilst all of this takes a level of discipline and rigour to implement, it can also provide a less than secure pathway for an unauthorised person to gain access to the systems if Cyber Security considerations are ignored. This paper will discuss Aurizon’s recognition of the Cyber Security threat to the company as a whole and the signalling system in particular and what has been done to reduce the risks for both.
|2017 - July - Motky et al - BYTING RAILWAY INTERLOCKING REQUIREMENTS|
Jacek Mocki PhD, MSc, BEng CPEng MIRSE NPER
Shane Curtin MBA, BEng
Yulan Liu MSc, BEng MIRSE, RPEQ
This paper is focused on one of the strategies that could be undertaken when approaching innovative areas in rail engineering. It describes an adoption of developing rail standards e.g. EULYNX and railML. Authors aim to look into an example of engineering process, describing ways to improve the process by applying some predictable innovation (innovation that delivers an expected outcome) techniques. An improved outcome from such development could be applied more efficiently to the benefit of reducing uncertainty of a designer, optimising asset usage, reducing the operational cost and many more.
|2017 - July - Gash - An engineer’s journey to achieving conscious competence|
Cassandra Gash MIRSE, MIEAust, MAIPM, BEng(Hons), GDSignalling & Telecommunications,
CPPM Melbourne Metro Rail Authority, Senior Signalling Project Manager
This paper highlights the requirements and likely challenges a graduate engineer will encounter in their professional formative years, and provides recommendations on how to fast-track a career in the rail signalling industry.
The gap in professional engineering competence is assessed through comparison of the competence of a graduate en- gineer from university compared to that required for the rail signalling industry. The commonly used 70:20:10 learning and development model is reviewed, in the context of the industry, so that graduate engineer learning, development, and experience can be tailored to address these gaps and support career advancement.
The paper concludes with an examination of competence related Australian legislation and Rail Transport Operator’s requirements that an engineer must comply with to progress from a state of unconscious incompetence to conscious competence. This paper draws upon numerous sources and highlights the commonalities and some of the inconsisten- cies in approach to achieving competence.
|2017 - July - Burns - Electronic virtual trainstops|
Peter Burns MBA, BAppSci (Elect), FIRSE, CPEng, FIEAust
As signalling technology moves from the world of the fixed signal to the world of Communication Based systems, one major issue which arises is how to deal with the legacy unfitted train.
In a world where the signal engineer has involvement in defining the train’s on-board systems, this paper will explore three specific subsystems and the interfaces between them needed to achieve operability. One subsystem is part of the infrastructure, associated with the communications based signalling itself. The second is conceptually portable, but operationally part of the equipment taken on board the train. The third is the electronic virtual trainstop itself – the core on-board system. The issue with defining an on-board system for an unfitted train seems apparent just looking at the terms. In reality, “lack of fitment” covers a range of possibilities, ranging from no fitment whatsoever, through a very basic system-independent facility (here we find the Electronic Virtual Trainstop) to a train fully fitted with somebody else’s Communication Based signalling. Each possibility will be discussed. By defining the intermediate system and some basic open interfaces, the paper will show how the issue of interoperability can be managed for the full range of possible trains.
|2017 - July - Banerjee - Monologue of a Byte by Byte traveller|
Somnath Banerjee B. Tech, FIRSE, MIEEE, MIRSTE, RPEQ
The history of “Byte by Byte” Railway signalling is also the history of new technology for Railway Signalling. Any discussion on this subject will remain incomplete unless we know how to manage new technology bite by bite.
The introduction of new technology in Railway Signalling systems, more often than not, is a challenging exercise. This assumes significant importance because compared to the investment and its physical visibility its impact is very high. This paper discusses how the challenges can be managed in a structured manner.
Some important steps can help reduce the labour pains of introduction of new technology in a Railway signalling system.
|2017 - July - Baker - Queensland Rail: AWS to ETCS|
Brett Baker BE, MBA, MIRSE, MRTSA
The principle form of train protection for the metropolitan rail region of Queensland has been the Automatic Warning system. In 1988 the ERICAB 700 Automatic Train Control system was introduced onto the regional North Coast Line of the Queensland Rail network. It was followed in 1994 by the WESTECT Automatic Train Protection system, which now provides train protection for over 2500 route kilometres on the regional rail network within Queensland. The Automatic Warning System remains the train protection system stalwart for the metropolitan rail network, ERICAB is no longer in use and the WESTECT Automatic Train Protection system is all but life-expired, so Queensland Rail now looks beyond these systems for the future application of train protection for the rail network – European Train Control System.
|2017 - July - Nardi and Revell - Migration methodologies for CBTC and ERTMS|
Federico Nardi BCompE (Hons), RE(OIGenova)
Ansaldo STS Australia Pty Ltd
Howard Revell BA, CEng, RPE (Elec), RPEQ (Elec), HonFIRSE MIEEE
Ansaldo STS Australia Pty Ltd
This paper focuses on the differing aspects of the migration processes and methods involved in transforming existing legacy metro and mainline signalling systems over to CBTC or ERTMS based systems. Three of Ansaldo STS’s current European brownfield projects have been selected to provide scenarios, with each scenario offering a specific approach to a migration methodology that satisfies the particular nature of the project and the needs of the customer organisation funding the project.
The three scenarios relate to three different customer organisations:
These scenarios provide a useful background concerning the need for effective system planning to support efficient design and implementation tasks, without causing disruption to revenue service traffic. However, despite this approach being very well established and practiced in our industry, it is very costly in terms of time, effort and funds and perhaps there is an alternative migration mitigation approach that could be investigated and adopted. These scenarios raise a number of points that may be usefully heeded by others involved in similar migration projects.
|2016 - Sept - Cox - Level Crossings, When is enough, enough?|
|2016 - July - Pfister - Swiss Army Knife vs KISS How to optimise a level crossing 1|
Assuming you get the job to implement or update a new level crossing: You will be confronted with lots of stakeholders,
|2016 - July - Macdougall - Headway as Part of the Operating Plan 1|
Signal engineers and train operations staff often misunderstand each other when talking about headway.
When someone in the operations team refers to headway, they actually mean the interval between trains expressed in minutes. They assume that the interval between trains is enough to deliver a reliable on-time service.
Signal engineers however calculate headway as the absolute minimum time between following trains that will allow drivers to retain line speed without having to apply brakes due to passing yellow signals.
The signal design will generally try to space signals so that there is a fairly uniform headway across a section of line. The worst headway on the line sets the "ruling headway" for the line. This is sometimes called the theoretical signalling headway. Trains travelling closer than the ruling headway will meet at least one yellow signal and be forced to apply brakes, and will therefore lose time. This in turn will delay the following train and so on, causing cascading and compounding delays.
Several factors contribute to achieving reliable train frequencies, such as the permitted line speed, driver behaviour, train acceleration & braking rates, train length, signalling principles (such as overlap length), planned station dwell time, and most importantly, passenger behaviour.
This paper provides a brief background on classical headway theory; some insight on how track speed and station dwell time impact on achievable capacity; a case study to demonstrate that terminal stations may pose a greater constraint on capacity than the signalling; and a suggested method to allow quick assessment of achievable capacity on a new line.
|2016 - July - Heibel - CBTC Versus ETCS - Score and Forecast 1|
Modern in-cab signalling can increase capacity beyond the limits of conventional legacy systems and also improve service punctuality. The present market for in-cab signalling is divided in two segments. For mainline railways on a national level, the European Train Control System (ETCS) is preferred by railway operators well beyond the reach of European legislation. For high performance metro-style city railways, Communications Based Train Control (CBTC) is the solution of choice. Both technologies have different purposes and histories and consequentially developed distinct strengths but also weaknesses.
The suburban railway systems in the major Australian cities appear in a transition from a mainline legacy to high capacity metro ambitions. The technology selection between ETCS and CBTC is therefore less straightforward with no clear "right" or "wrong" and examples for either system evolving in Australia. However, operators need to recognise and accept the consequences of selecting either technology.
The paper concludes with an outlook on further development of both technologies, which concentrates on addressing the individual shortcomings while maintaining existing advantages. The evolving subject of "convergence" between ETCS and CBTC will be discussed to assess whether there will be only one "best" signalling technology in the future.
|2016 - July - Green - Re-Engineering Level Crossing Safety 1|
This paper describes components and processes to re-engineering level crossing safety by controlling the movement over level crossings for both road and rail vehicles. This is primarily aimed at highway crossings and in particular remotely located crossings on heavy haulage rail lines.
The rail corridor has always been designated as a permanent way with the train driver as the only stopping control to avoid collisions with obstructions. With the introduction of new technologies and driverless train projects the need to detect obstructions and control the passage of trains across conflict zones such as level crossings has become vital.
These new technologies must be introduced with strict operational guidelines that are fit for purpose. Technology that increases train delays due to false or unreliable alarms is not an acceptable solution.
System components for this design will include
Duplicated Flashing Lights
Duplicated Half Boom Gates
Barrier protection around level crossing equipment locations
CCTV with integrated crossing state logging
Obstruction Detection in the crossing zone
Duplicated Advance Warning Lights
Road Speed Reduction
Full Road Pavement Markings and duplicated road signage
Vital Communications to stop the train
All components play an important role in level crossing protection.
|2016 - July - Burns - Time Based Movement Authorities 1||
Modern communications based signalling places improved signalling functionality on board the train.
This can be used to enforce conventional temporary speed restrictions using location based authorities. With these the train ensures its speed is maintained below the temporary maximum between two defined points.
In a related class are time based authorities. A time based authority commences at a specified time and continue to a specified event (which is not necessarily time based). Two examples are presented.
The first relates to a requirement to restrict passing speeds within a long tunnel to below a specified maximum (as is the case for the Seikan tunnel in northern Japan).
In this case the signalling system is aware of the location and authorized speed of the two passing trains in advance. With this knowledge a passing point can be predicted in terms of location. However, a speed restriction based on this criterion can be shown to be unsound as a provider of safety. Thus a safety benefit is obtained by defining the passing point in terms of time; a time based authority emerges.
The second relates to level crossing protection.
It is conventional in a class of signalling to require a train to obtain an authority to cross a protected level crossing.
Communications base signalling allows a train to communicate its arrival time to the level crossing as part of the process for obtaining that authority. This is another class of time based authority – the train obtains authority to cross at a specified time.
Once communicated, the train is able to regulate its progress safely to ensure it does not arrive prior to the specified time. The crossing is able to ensure that the standard warning is provided prior to the authorised arrival time.
The paper explores the characteristics of, and requirements for time based authorities.
|2016 - April - Naweed and Aitken - Lookout!|
Anjum Naweed BSc (Hons), MSc, PhD, CPE
Central Queensland University
Jeanette Aitken BE (Hons), MEngSc, Dip VET, MIEEE, AMIRSE
Trains are the fastest and heaviest of land vehicles and the intent of railway systems design is to transport them safely and efficiently from one location to another. Track workers and maintainers are the unsung heroes of rail safety but are often placed in dynamic and hazardous situations, rendering them vulnerable to the very things they work to protect. The dramatic irony inherent in their work is addressed by the “Lookout working’ concept of safeworking where a range of technologies are used to assist in the provision of acceptable margins of personal safety from approaching trains.
This technical paper aims to conceptualise the degrees of control and types of technologies used to protect the safety of track workers and maintain the security of their work sites. Presented from a human factors perspective using a systems thinking approach, the paper articulates key lessons that can be drawn from previous accidents and “near-misses” associated with failures in track worker protection, which have been investigated in the context of railways in the UK and Australasia. The objective of the paper is to evaluate the viability of utilising smarter technologies to achieve improvements in maintenance track worker safety within the Australian railway environment.