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pdf.png 2017 - March - Moore - Signalling system safety is NOT an absolute

Trevor Moore Hon FIRSE FIEA Aust

Australian Rail Track Corporation

We often design a signalling system and continue its operation even though there are significant changes in train operating conditions. Do we assume that is still as safe as the day it was commissioned into service?

Some cases are self-evident that safety has changed. If we increase the train speed over a level crossing we know that the approach warnings have to be reviewed and updated. Do we check and update if they have changed the road traffic classification to B double trucks?

When and how should we review the signalling system for safety of operations? What should be the catalyst to undertaking a review? Should this be part of the standard practice for signal engineers managing infrastructure and for signal designers on new works?
The paper addresses some of the situations that can arise leading to a change in the safety of the signalling system.

 



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pdf.png 2017 - March - McDonald - Is RAMS all BULL for Electromechanical Equipment?

Wayne McDonald BE (Elec) FIRSE

Siemens Limited

Railways are required to operate safely and one of the methods to demonstrate this is type approval of signalling equipment. That approval must include documentation of high RAMS (Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety) when applied in vital and even non-vital applications. Suppliers have provided such values, in some form or another, for electrical, electronic and programmable electronic equipment for many years. The limitations and applicability of these values have not always been well understood and they have often been misapplied. The decisions for product comparison or maintenance plans could therefore be compromised or invalid.

More recently, purchasers, and personnel assessing type approval are demanding values such as SIL (Safety Integrity Level) and MTBF (Mean Time Between Failure) for electromechanical equipment and systems. The standards currently used for programmable electronic systems clearly state that using them to derive values for electromechanical is inappropriate.

This paper delves into the importance of understanding and applying meaningful RAMS values for signalling equipment and addresses the inappropriateness of SIL and MTBF for Electromechanical Equipment. It continues to offer some suggestions for how RAMS can be used for Electromechanical Equipment.



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pdf.png 2017 - March - Leveque - Advanced features over ETCS for suburban railway operation

Dr Olivier Leveque

Alstom Signalling – Australia New Zealand

The advanced features over ETCS detailed in this paper are Virtual Block Sectioning and scalable Automatic Train Operation. These features can be incrementally implemented to meet the current and future business requirements of a suburban railway operation. A case study is presented to illustrate the performance benefits of a scalable ATO overlaid onto an ETCS solution for a suburban application.



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pdf.png 2017 - March - Gillespie - Are CAD drawings the best way to design signalling systems

Rob Gillespie NTD Elec Eng.


I&E Systems Pty Ltd

Modern railway signalling systems now incorporate computer-based interlocking, and the wiring is predominantly simple input/output functions, so, is CAD really the best way to design these high integrity systems?



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pdf.png 2017 - March - D'Cruz - Do we have the backbone to support emerging technologies?

Malcolm D’Cruz M.E. Mechatronics


Public Transport Authority of Western Australia

David Lim  MSc. Telecommunication Management

UXC Ltd – A CSC Company

Railways are always increasing the number of network services to cope with emerging technologies. The success of Communication Based Train Control (CBTC) depends on the ability of the backbone communication system to guarantee high bandwidths and reliability. Thus the traditional railway communication network is gradually moving towards a carrier grade network servicing both internal as well as external clients.

The aim of this paper is to show how Software Defined Networks (SDN) adopted by telecom service providers as a common platform for all network services can benefit the railway networking environment to cope with constantly emerging technologies.



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pdf.png 2017 - March - Boshier - Technology based asset management

Steve Boshier FIRSE, FCILTA

Auckland Transport

Asset Management is an area that continues to develop through innovation, technical developments and through new ways of looking at whole of life management. In tough economic times, businesses often take short cuts with asset management in a bid to remain profitable. Its usually one of the first areas whose budget gets cut back for a whole range of reasons. Such a decision only provides a short term solution to a problem that ultimately gets worse and comes back to bite even greater.

Technologies such as BIM, Mobility, Analytics, and a suite of ISO standards represents a coming of age for rail systems asset management. They are transforming the rail sector and are helping to drive a long term approach to maintenance with benefits. One that is now allowing staff to do more with less whilst allowing them to improve the asset reliability, availability and system safety.



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pdf.png 2017 - July - Wimberley - Cyber Security in a Heavy Haul Railway

Jeff Wimberley BE, Associate Member IRSE

Aurizon PTY LTD

As technology changes, modern railway signalling systems are becoming more and more reliant on IP Data networks for both their day to day operation as well as for their supportability. For example we now have processor based interlockings at one end of a yard being connected to object controllers at the other end of the yard using IP based data networks. We also have a need to remotely access interlockings and associated systems such as axle counters as well as the data network elements from a central location or a location remote to the organisation to monitor and maintain service of these systems. Whilst all of this takes a level of discipline and rigour to implement, it can also provide a less than secure pathway for an unauthorised person to gain access to the systems if Cyber Security considerations are ignored. This paper will discuss Aurizon’s recognition of the Cyber Security threat to the company as a whole and the signalling system in particular and what has been done to reduce the risks for both.



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pdf.png 2017 - July - Motky et al - BYTING RAILWAY INTERLOCKING REQUIREMENTS

Jacek Mocki PhD, MSc, BEng CPEng MIRSE NPER

MOTZKY

Shane Curtin MBA, BEng

AURIZON

Yulan Liu MSc, BEng MIRSE, RPEQ

AURIZON

This paper is focused on one of the strategies that could be undertaken when approaching innovative areas in rail engineering. It describes an adoption of developing rail standards e.g. EULYNX and railML. Authors aim to look into an example of engineering process, describing ways to improve the process by applying some predictable innovation (innovation that delivers an expected outcome) techniques. An improved outcome from such development could be applied more efficiently to the benefit of reducing uncertainty of a designer, optimising asset usage, reducing the operational cost and many more.



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pdf.png 2017 - July - Gash - An engineer’s journey to achieving conscious competence

Cassandra Gash MIRSE, MIEAust, MAIPM, BEng(Hons), GDSignalling & Telecommunications,

CPPM Melbourne Metro Rail Authority, Senior Signalling Project Manager

This paper highlights the requirements and likely challenges a graduate engineer will encounter in their professional formative years, and provides recommendations on how to fast-track a career in the rail signalling industry.

The gap in professional engineering competence is assessed through comparison of the competence of a graduate en- gineer from university compared to that required for the rail signalling industry. The commonly used 70:20:10 learning and development model is reviewed, in the context of the industry, so that graduate engineer learning, development, and experience can be tailored to address these gaps and support career advancement.

The paper concludes with an examination of competence related Australian legislation and Rail Transport Operator’s requirements that an engineer must comply with to progress from a state of unconscious incompetence to conscious competence. This paper draws upon numerous sources and highlights the commonalities and some of the inconsisten- cies in approach to achieving competence.



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pdf.png 2017 - July - Burns - Electronic virtual trainstops

Peter Burns MBA, BAppSci (Elect), FIRSE, CPEng, FIEAust

PYB Consulting

As signalling technology moves from the world of the fixed signal to the world of Communication Based systems, one major issue which arises is how to deal with the legacy unfitted train.
Traditionally, the available answers to that issue have been:
    •    Don’t allow non-fitted trains to run on the relevant part of the network (the captive fleet option); or 

    •    Build the Communications based System as an overlay on traditional signalling infrastructure including its 
fixed signals. 
This second option in particular denies the railway any of the cost benefits associated with the new technology and acts as a barrier to its use. 
This paper will explore the alternative – to make the signalling for the unfitted train an overlay on the underlying Communication Based Signalling, rather than the other way around. 
The method for doing this will be explored via the example of the Electronic Virtual Trainstop. We do not have one of these right now, but we are in a position to develop its specification.


In a world where the signal engineer has involvement in defining the train’s on-board systems, this paper will explore three specific subsystems and the interfaces between them needed to achieve operability. One subsystem is part of the infrastructure, associated with the communications based signalling itself. The second is conceptually portable, but operationally part of the equipment taken on board the train. The third is the electronic virtual trainstop itself – the core on-board system. 
The issue with defining an on-board system for an unfitted train seems apparent just looking at the terms. In reality, “lack of fitment” covers a range of possibilities, ranging from no fitment whatsoever, through a very basic system-independent facility (here we find the Electronic Virtual Trainstop) to a train fully fitted with somebody else’s Communication Based signalling. Each possibility will be discussed. 
By defining the intermediate system and some basic open interfaces, the paper will show how the issue of interoperability can be managed for the full range of possible trains.



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pdf.png 2017 - July - Banerjee - Monologue of a Byte by Byte traveller

Somnath Banerjee B. Tech, FIRSE, MIEEE, MIRSTE, RPEQ

The history of “Byte by Byte” Railway signalling is also the history of new technology for Railway Signalling.  Any discussion on this subject will remain incomplete unless we know how to manage new technology bite by bite.

The introduction of new technology in Railway Signalling systems, more often than not, is a challenging exercise. This assumes significant importance because compared to the investment and its physical visibility its impact is very high. This paper discusses how the challenges can be managed in a structured manner.

Some important steps can help reduce the labour pains of introduction of new technology in a Railway signalling system.
    .    a)  Clear understanding of the operator’s need for the new technology. 

    .    b)  Choosing the right technology to match the operator’s expectations . 

    .    c)  Structuring the development to match the operator requirements using several independent blocks. This is 
again an important step and if not thought out properly, it can make changes to the design difficult and costly. 

    .    d)  Designing the sub-systems with enough resilience to allow with minimum effects to other sub-systems. 

    .    e)  A strategy for testing the sub-systems to ensure minimum changes to it once the sub-systems are integrated into a single system



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pdf.png 2017 - July - Baker - Queensland Rail: AWS to ETCS

Brett Baker BE, MBA, MIRSE, MRTSA

Queensland Rail

The principle form of train protection for the metropolitan rail region of Queensland has been the Automatic Warning system. In 1988 the ERICAB 700 Automatic Train Control system was introduced onto the regional North Coast Line of the Queensland Rail network. It was followed in 1994 by the WESTECT Automatic Train Protection system, which now provides train protection for over 2500 route kilometres on the regional rail network within Queensland. The Automatic Warning System remains the train protection system stalwart for the metropolitan rail network, ERICAB is no longer in use and the WESTECT Automatic Train Protection system is all but life-expired, so Queensland Rail now looks beyond these systems for the future application of train protection for the rail network – European Train Control System.



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pdf.png 2017 - July - Nardi and Revell - Migration methodologies for CBTC and ERTMS

Federico Nardi BCompE (Hons), RE(OIGenova)

Ansaldo STS Australia Pty Ltd

Howard Revell BA, CEng, RPE (Elec), RPEQ (Elec), HonFIRSE MIEEE


Ansaldo STS Australia Pty Ltd

This paper focuses on the differing aspects of the migration processes and methods involved in transforming existing legacy metro and mainline signalling systems over to CBTC or ERTMS based systems. Three of Ansaldo STS’s current European brownfield projects have been selected to provide scenarios, with each scenario offering a specific approach to a migration methodology that satisfies the particular nature of the project and the needs of the customer organisation funding the project.

The three scenarios relate to three different customer organisations:

  • Stockholm Metro Red Line - CBTC for Storstockholms Lokaltrafik (SL) 

  • Haparandabanan, part of the ESTER Project - ERTMS L2 for Trafikverket 

  • Florence – Rome HSL upgrade - ERTMS L2 for Rete Ferroviaria Italiana (RFI.


These scenarios provide a useful background concerning the need for effective system planning to support efficient design and implementation tasks, without causing disruption to revenue service traffic. However, despite this approach being very well established and practiced in our industry, it is very costly in terms of time, effort and funds and perhaps there is an alternative migration mitigation approach that could be investigated and adopted. These scenarios raise a number of points that may be usefully heeded by others involved in similar migration projects.



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pdf.png 2016 - Sept - Cox - Level Crossings, When is enough, enough?

Introduction
 Level crossings represent high risk exposure for railway operators.
 Obligation for engineers and railway operators is to ensure level crossing risks are seen to be reduced So Far As Is Reasonably Practicable (SFAIRP).
 Grade separation is best solution but how can we ‘sweat’ level crossing assets?
 Once you have ‘lights, booms and gongs’ what then?
 Road complexity, number of cars, type of traffic, frequency of trains all increase risk
 What else can we do?




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pdf.png 2016 - July - Pfister - Swiss Army Knife vs KISS How to optimise a level crossing 1

Assuming you get the job to implement or update a new level crossing: You will be confronted with lots of stakeholders,
influencers and legislative guidelines. The national regulator is giving you a certain framework. Investors, be it the
railway operator or the infrastructure owner usually limit your ambitions in terms of money. There is only a limited budget
available and it needs to be spent wisely. In contrast, other stakeholders such as end users or neighbours, living next to
a crossing, usually tell you exactly how things should work - or more often - how they shouldn’t.
This document addresses general areas of conflict. Furthermore, it shows how national regulator, infrastructure owner or
operator can influence the value for money proposition to achieve improved cost structures or whole of life costs as well
what suppliers can do in order to ensure lower cost and safe level crossings. The paper highlights cost savings due to
better selected requirements and provides a simple example.



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pdf.png 2016 - July - Macdougall - Headway as Part of the Operating Plan 1

Signal engineers and train operations staff often misunderstand each other when talking about headway.

When someone in the operations team refers to headway, they actually mean the interval between trains expressed in minutes. They assume that the interval between trains is enough to deliver a reliable on-time service.

Signal engineers however calculate headway as the absolute minimum time between following trains that will allow drivers to retain line speed without having to apply brakes due to passing yellow signals.

The signal design will generally try to space signals so that there is a fairly uniform headway across a section of line. The worst headway on the line sets the "ruling headway" for the line. This is sometimes called the theoretical signalling headway. Trains travelling closer than the ruling headway will meet at least one yellow signal and be forced to apply brakes, and will therefore lose time. This in turn will delay the following train and so on, causing cascading and compounding delays.

Several factors contribute to achieving reliable train frequencies, such as the permitted line speed, driver behaviour, train acceleration & braking rates, train length, signalling principles (such as overlap length), planned station dwell time, and most importantly, passenger behaviour.

This paper provides a brief background on classical headway theory; some insight on how track speed and station dwell time impact on achievable capacity; a case study to demonstrate that terminal stations may pose a greater constraint on capacity than the signalling; and a suggested method to allow quick assessment of achievable capacity on a new line.



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pdf.png 2016 - July - Heibel - CBTC Versus ETCS - Score and Forecast 1 HOT

Modern in-cab signalling can increase capacity beyond the limits of conventional legacy systems and also improve service punctuality. The present market for in-cab signalling is divided in two segments. For mainline railways on a national level, the European Train Control System (ETCS) is preferred by railway operators well beyond the reach of European legislation. For high performance metro-style city railways, Communications Based Train Control (CBTC) is the solution of choice. Both technologies have different purposes and histories and consequentially developed distinct strengths but also weaknesses.

The suburban railway systems in the major Australian cities appear in a transition from a mainline legacy to high capacity metro ambitions. The technology selection between ETCS and CBTC is therefore less straightforward with no clear "right" or "wrong" and examples for either system evolving in Australia. However, operators need to recognise and accept the consequences of selecting either technology.

The paper concludes with an outlook on further development of both technologies, which concentrates on addressing the individual shortcomings while maintaining existing advantages. The evolving subject of "convergence" between ETCS and CBTC will be discussed to assess whether there will be only one "best" signalling technology in the future.



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pdf.png 2016 - July - Green - Re-Engineering Level Crossing Safety 1

This paper describes components and processes to re-engineering level crossing safety by controlling the movement over level crossings for both road and rail vehicles. This is primarily aimed at highway crossings and in particular remotely located crossings on heavy haulage rail lines.

The rail corridor has always been designated as a permanent way with the train driver as the only stopping control to avoid collisions with obstructions. With the introduction of new technologies and driverless train projects the need to detect obstructions and control the passage of trains across conflict zones such as level crossings has become vital.

These new technologies must be introduced with strict operational guidelines that are fit for purpose. Technology that increases train delays due to false or unreliable alarms is not an acceptable solution.

System components for this design will include

 Duplicated Flashing Lights

 Duplicated Half Boom Gates

 Barrier protection around level crossing equipment locations

 CCTV with integrated crossing state logging

 Obstruction Detection in the crossing zone

 Duplicated Advance Warning Lights

 Road Speed Reduction

 Rumble Strips

 Full Road Pavement Markings and duplicated road signage

 Vital Communications to stop the train

All components play an important role in level crossing protection.



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pdf.png 2016 - April - Naweed and Aitken - Lookout!

Anjum Naweed BSc (Hons), MSc, PhD, CPE

Central Queensland University

Jeanette Aitken BE (Hons), MEngSc, Dip VET, MIEEE, AMIRSE

Competency Australia

 

Trains are the fastest and heaviest of land vehicles and the intent of railway systems design is to transport them safely and efficiently from one location to another. Track workers and maintainers are the unsung heroes of rail safety but are often placed in dynamic and hazardous situations, rendering them vulnerable to the very things they work to protect. The dramatic irony inherent in their work is addressed by the “Lookout working’ concept of safeworking where a range of technologies are used to assist in the provision of acceptable margins of personal safety from approaching trains.

This technical paper aims to conceptualise the degrees of control and types of technologies used to protect the safety of track workers and maintain the security of their work sites. Presented from a human factors perspective using a systems thinking approach, the paper articulates key lessons that can be drawn from previous accidents and “near-misses” associated with failures in track worker protection, which have been investigated in the context of railways in the UK and Australasia. The objective of the paper is to evaluate the viability of utilising smarter technologies to achieve improvements in maintenance track worker safety within the Australian railway environment.



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