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2004 - October - Simes - SPAD Mitigation - A Regulatory View | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Tony Simes B.Eng (Elec), MIEAust, CPEngAustralian Transport Safety BureauThe responsibility for rail safety regulation in Australia lies with each State or Territory. Each State or Territory, with the exception of the Australian Capital Territory where rail safety is administered by New South Wales, has enacted its own rail safety legislation. The framework is based on co-regulatory principles, whereby each rail organisation is predominately responsible for the management of its rail safety related operations, and the Rail Safety Regulator responsible for administering each organisations accreditation and verifying their obligations under the relevant rail safety legislation. A "Signal Passed at Danger" (SPAD), describes an incident when a train passes a stop signal without the authority to do so. SPADs present one of the highest safety risks facing the rail industry and are only one precursor to a potentially catastrophic rail incident. They occur where there is an interface between drivers employed by Rail Operators, and signalling infrastructure managed by Track Owners. It is therefore essential that all parties co-operate and apply an appropriate level of resource and commitment to reduce the likelihood of a SPAD incident. This paper presents a Rail Safety Regulators view on SPADs and their mitigation. The paper will discuss topics such as the investigation of incidents, the potential cause, evaluation of risks, identifying control measures and the periodical review of the risk management process. Issues relating to recording, reporting and trending of SPAD incidents at organisational, State and national levels will also be discussed. The aim of the paper is to stimulate thought and discussion in the attempt to identifying new and innovative methods for improving rail safety and addressing the important issue of SPAD mitigation. |
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