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R. Baird B.E. M.I.R.S.E. Project Manager, Public Transport Corporation Victoria The rationalisation of signalling and trackwork in the Victorian country rail network is an important part of V/Line8s investment strategy.Since the formation of V/Line in 1983:- 43 signalled yards have been completely abolished where lines have been closed. 18 yards with mechanical interlockings have been "straightrailed" and the signalling abolished. 10 yards have had local control panels installed to replace 16 mechanical interlockings. 6 yards ( 7 mech. interlockings) have been remotely controlled and 2 yards have been converted to automatic signalling. In addition, many installations have been "demanned" by requiring train crews to perform their own safeworking under "Train Orders".To facilitate this, 5 locations have been converted from mechanical interlockings to plunger or staff/annett/cross locking. Where yards are to be retained, it is not a simple case of replacing mechanical interlockings by relay interlockings controlled locally or remotely. Each case must be considered on merit and often lower cost alternatives to relay interlockings are chosen to ensure return on investment is maximised.On low volume freight lines which do not carry time sensitive traffic e.g. grain, the 'simple solution' of plunger or staff locking operated by train crews under train orders is entirely appropriate.
Brian Luber Sales Manager Transportation Systems Siemens Ltd Australia
Tony Godber CEng, BSc(Eng) MIET, MIRSE Rio Tinto To perform its safety critical functions, a signalling system for a rail network needs to have timely information on the position of trains and the occupancy status of track sections. This is essential to perform its primary function of preventing collisions and derailments. The fundamental requirements of train detection systems are described, including proof of train absence for setting of points and operation of signals, proof of train presence for additional controls and updating of train position for network management and customer information purposes. Existing technologies for track based train detection, including track circuits and axle counters, are then discussed, including many limitations on their use and application and associated safety risks. The and complications arising from the interface with other engineering disciplines, in particular the permanent way and traction power supplies are briefly explored. Consideration of train and communications based alternatives is then covered, including a discussion of whether this is the future for train detection.
Richard Stepniewski NSW State Manager for Signalling, Electrification & Communications ALSTOM Australia - Transport was successfully commissioned at Blacktown, in two stages as part of the Blacktown Resignalling Project: - Stage 1: control of Blacktown and Quakers Hill in December 1999. - Stage 2: control of Richmond Line and Quakers Hill in March 2000. The Blacktown SigView was the first VDU based signalling control system to be commissioned in the Sydney Metropolitan area. It controls four local SSI interlockings and remotely controls four relay based interlockings on the Richmond Line. Of these relay based interlockings, three are nx (entrance/exit) type and one is OCS type. For Stage 1, it controlled the existing unit lever interlocking at Quakers Hill, for Stage 2 Quakers Hill was converted to SSI. SigView provides a seamless and consistent operator interface to all these various types of interlockings. The Blacktown SigView features entrance/exit route setting control, train tracking, sleeving, a notepad facility, alarms and logging/archiving facilities. The system has been in operation for over two years now and has proved to be reliable.
Andrew Blakeley-Smith MIRSE Systems Consultant Teknis International Railroad Systems "Signalling" to the average communications engineer normally means the process by means of which a telephone or data call is established, monitored and then cleared down between two or more parties. Any thought that there should be radical differences in procedures or basic philosophies that prevent or even make difficult this ojective is almost a contradiction of the requirement to communicate in the first place. We thus now have a world wide communications network in which a telephone call can be placed anywhere and without too much difficulty, at least in principle, end up in the right place. This has been achieved by specifying the interface points of the various telephone networks, at a United Nations level, to be compatible in terms of signalling information, levels and frequency allocations etc. A spin-off from this has been that many of the indiv'dual items of hardware kave become interchangeable - even if the packaging is not identical and thus a walk through a telephone exchange will reveal a veritable United Nations of equipment happily CO-existing for most of the time. Aircraft also need to communicate but unlike telephone exchanges also move around, thus when a piece of hardware fails a long way from home base, not only must the replacement meet the same electrical interfaces but it must also fit in the same hole as the failed equipment. Thus from the Communications and aircraft industries has developed a modular way of specifying and building complex systems on a "Form Fit Function" basis. ATCS - the Advanced Train Control System - has grown out of the objectives of the use of the appropriate design philosophies to use widely available hardware elements to produce a signalling system which is multisourced and facilitates all operational and maintenance aspects of interworking between the railroads in the USA and Canada. The specification documents for such a system are formidable and take up as much space as several telephone directories, it is not the intent of this paper to give a comprehensive summary of this documentation but to illustrate some of the more interesting elements in the design.
Klaus Mindel Dr.-Ing. Thales Rail Signalling Solutions ETCS Level 2 is developed as a European standard and several projects are already in operation, mainly on a national basis but increasingly crossing borders. ETCS sparks more and more interest outside Europe, because of its maturity, functionality, flexibility and safety. For the long term perspective, customers value this public standard as a guarantee for multi sourcing, providing long term system availability and competition. Interoperability is a relevant property in itself and on top of that a prerequisite for multi sourcing. One major component of ETCS Level 2 trackside is the Radio Block Centre. This technical paper examines, to what extent RBCs are interoperable already today, how compatible they are at their interfaces, their level of functional standardization and how they fit into an existing infrastructure. As most important topic the paper gives an example of how interoperability can be tested.
ILTIS is a traffic-management system (TMS) which integrates all the essential functions required for the management of a railway network. Its main focus is to simplify all aspects of railway management (from ergonomic operator input to the optimization of the track reserveration periods), resulting in a consistent level of punctuality with train services. As ILTIS was conceived from the beginning as a totally integrated system (and not as a loosely coupled collection of independent systems), there is a great synergy between all of its components. An integrated system also benefits from the simplification of a control center's infrastructure and significantly reduces operating and maintenance costs. ILTIS consists of a network of several computers, which can be tailored to satisfy each customer's individual requirements. It provides a 24 x 7 service with a built-in redundancy that avoids system outages due to hardware faults that may occur.
J.R. Clarke S.R.A. Although the obvious benefits of a C.T.C. type signalling system are well know, the documented, I feel it was with some misgivings that Executive of the S.R.A finally gave their blessing to the awarding of an approved contract. I base this statement of a number of items which have come to light :- 1. The Executive was somewhat alarmed at the number of failures which initially occurred on the North Coast C.T.C. 2. The susceptibility of the electronic equipment to lightning strike. and 3. The overrun in time and funding which occured on North Coast C.T.C. In November 1984 the submission for approval was submitted with the following documentary evidence of performance. 1. Staff Savings: North Coast C.T.C. 195 individuals Junee Albury C.T.C. 46 individuals
G P Nikandros FIRSE Safety is fundamental to a railway business. Railway signalling and telecommunications are very important elements in the systems used for the safe working of trains and consequently have a significant safety role. It is therefore important that railway signalling and telecommunications systems are designed, constructed, tested and maintained so as to provide the level of safety expected by the public, the rail industry and regulatory authorities.
W. Talbot Major rail operations safety incidents such as collisions can be reduced, using railway signalling technology, by controlling the speed and spacing of trains. This provides the essential safety engineering system. The installed signalling system will only provide it's safe control functions if their built-in fail safe properties are continuously monitored and maintained at predetermined and measurable levels of reliable performance. The operations safety and engineering reliability requirements can be achieved by the implementation of quality assurance systems which are focused on the signalling system which are vital to the maintenance of the operating system. Quality assurance systems provide a methodology for the undertaking of work practices to a standard. Quality systems are employed to ensure routine work practices are carried out consistently and to a procedure but how does this apply to safety and safety systems used in the ranway industry and in particular signalling. In this paper we explore the statement "Safety is the Quality Imperative for Signalling" and what it means to the development of quality systems, with some helpful hints towards developing a quality system.
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I started in signalling more than 30 years ago at British Rail, where I learnt how to design interlockings, initially in relay circuits, and then by programming Solid State Interlockings. This work sparked my interest in safety critical syste
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