Technical Meetings are held three times per year.
Papers are available here for download.
You must be logged in to be able to download content.
P. de Visser Rail Engineering Group, Signals & Communication Engineer The high operating costs, the unreliability and the lack of expansion capacity of the MetRail communication network has resulted in the replacement of the following telephone exchanges:- a. The Ericsson OS1029, a SO year old hybrid rotary and step by step exchange located in the old Head Office at 67 Spencer Street, which provided 1500 extensions; b. The Ericsson ARD571, an 11 year old cross bar-gxskange-located at the Electrical Control Centre in Batman Avenue, providing 270Bextensions; c. A modified Ericsson OS1029, an 18 year old hybrid step by step crossbar exchange located at the Spotswood Stores Depot, providing 500 extensions. As well as these, a number of smaller PABXs and intercom exchanges were also replaced.
David Ness MIEAust, MIRSE Connell Wagner When first asked if I would be prepared to present a paper for the Adelaide IRSE I was somewhat mystified as to what I would present about. Although I have had a considerable association with the Adelaide urban network over the last 20 years it has, to be honest, some years since that involvement has involved practical activity that I consider may be of professional or technical interest to the membership of the IRSE. After a little thought however I realised how little I knew of the history of the Adelaide network, or indeed the history of any of Australia's rail networks, and decided that as many readers are likely to be in the same position as myself, ie. railway professionals unfamiliar with the history of the assets they work with daily, that a short summary of a selection of historic highlights pertaining to the Adelaide system would be as good a topic as any. Furthermore, and in order to tie in with the theme of this conference, I have elected to concentrate on the history of Adelaide Station and Yard itself rather than the entirety of the network.
Nick Coleman, Claire Turner, Guangyan Li and W. Ian Hamilton Human Engineering (Australia) Pty Ltd Human Engineering Ltd (UK) The role of human factors in understanding and modelling driver performance is now widely recognised as an essential step in the design and positioning of lineside signals and objects in order to support safe driving behaviours and prevent SPADs. This paper provides a brief overview of four extensive research projects that are investigating the capabilities and limitations of driver performance and generating data that are being applied to the reduction of SPADs in the UK. Each project is being conducted by Human Engineering in conjunction with Network Rail and/or RSSB (the Rail Safety and Standards Board).
Michael Strike Managing Director Selectrail (Australia) Pty Ltd Jarrod Crivelli Project Engineer Selectrail (Australia) Pty Ltd Utilisation of axle counters over the last two decades has been expanding to encompass many signalling and non-signalling applications. Their uses range from simple triggering devices for wayside equipment such as hot box detectors and weighing systems, to more complex train detection systems for train signalling. The use of high quality fail safe (SIL4) axle counters for occupancy detection have been widely applied in Australia for short track sections where communications are reliable and visual cues provide an extra level of safety confidence. Life cycle costs can be substantially lower with axle counters when compared to other technologies and with advancements in technology; capital costs can also be reduced. Longer block sections introduce an extra degree of design and procedural complexity. In the past, it has been difficult to appreciate the benefits of axle counters in these longer sections. The experience of the Australian Rail Track Corporation with small scale applications has allowed development of good operating procedures and the confidence to expand their use to block sections on the Spencer Junction to Tarcoola Line in South Australia.
Paul Huth BE(Elec), RPEQ, AMIRSE QR Network This paper provides an overview of the signalling systems and principles that are used on the QR network (excluding the standard gauge between Acacia Ridge and the NSW border). The content is intended to be informative only, describing the nature and meaning of aspects displayed to drivers, typical interlocking functions provided by control systems, and an overview of some of the technology systems that are used as part of the overall signalling system. Note that this paper is not intended to be comprehensive, or to be used as a design specification or design input. In some cases, a simplified description of the principle is provided to convey the intent, rather then providing a full description of the requirement. More detailed signalling specifications are available to designers of systems for the QR network. A number of these are listed as references to this paper.
John Aitken BE, MIEEE, AMIRSE Director Aitken & Partners Consulting Engineers The Sydney North Shore Times recently related a tale which should bring a chill to the spine of communications and signals engineers. I quote: Police say the series of events began at 3.00 pm on April 9 when the man visited a patient at Royal North Shore Hospital, St Leonards. As he was leaving, he saw a Chubb safe in one of the hospital offices. He placed the safe and a key locker on a hospital trolley and towed them to his car. He tied a rope around the safe and the trolley and tied them to the car bumper. He then towed the trolley along the Pacific Highway until the wheels fell off the trolley. The man got out of the car, unhooked the trolley and tied the rope to the safe, dragging it another 400 metres as sparks flew off the roadway. When he reached his home unit, he hired an angle grinder and cut the backing plate off the safe. Lane Cove police went to the home unit after the man's neighbours had complained about the noise. They found the man in a distraught state who told them he had found only $20 in the safe after he had finally opened it. Police said it cost the man $50 to hire the angle grinder. Communications and signals engineers are known and respected for their thoroughness and careful planning. They do not act on impulse but plan and design systems which are robust and have "fail-safe" operation and redundancy built in. None the less, the unforseen does occur. It may pass un-noticed, it may be identified as an incident or it may become a disaster. The impact is nearly always determined by the timing. If confirmation of this is needed one need only refer to Mr Nock's book "Historic Railway Disasters" or any issue of the "Aviation Safety Digest".
Eddie Murphy HND Engineering, MIRSE Westinghouse Rail Systems Australia It is timely to provide an update about ERTMS/ETCS given that there is a trial application currently in progress with RailCorp in NSW and other states have also shown considerable interest. Though the ERTMS/ETCS system is well defined and enables interoperability of trackside and onboard technologies from different suppliers, there are some critical high level and many detailed application decisions that will impact on the railway network once the system is in service. Some of the main factors to be considered when applying ERTMS/ETCS into a railway network are: • Network rules and procedures including safeworking• Train operations• Signalling principles• Drivers and human factors• Rolling stock• Maintenance• Capacity• Migration Many of the rail networks in Australia currently employ simple Train Protection technology e.g. trainstops, AWS and TPWS or in some cases have no train protection at all. It is a big step to go from this to a full cab signalling system that will fundamentally alter the way the system is operated. Railway organisations will therefore need to involve all stakeholders in the decision making process including Corporate Safety, Safeworking, Train Operations, Train Crewing, Drivers, Train Control, Engineering Standards, Rolling Stock and Signalling Maintenance and future capacity planning.
Anthony C. Howker (Past President) Noel J. Burton (WRSA) HonFIRSE & AMIRSE The first part of the paper describes the basic principles of European Automatic Train Protection (ATP) and the how it may be applied to an Australian working railway. It covers the major principles of application, to both trackside and onboard. The paper also describes the controls needed in the signalling and the necessary requirements for both loco and multiple units. The second part of the paper describes in detail how the European Train Control System (ETCS) Level 1 technology was applied on a working railway in Australia. It describes the difficulties encountered and the solutions found in the signalling application. It also comments on the need for flexibility in signalling principles and how they can be amended or simplified with the addition of ATP.
William J. Jack M.I.R.S.E, M.A.I.P.M. Union Switch & Signal (M) Sdn. Bhd. The Rawang to Ipoh project involves the construction of a new track and upgrading of the existing track between Rawang and Ipoh, a rail distance of 159km, to allow for a maximum design speed of 160 kph. This project has been promoted by the Malaysian Government as part of its eighth Malaysia Development Plan and is the first phase of the Malaysian segment of the Trans-Asia rail link project. The main components of the project involve the construction of new concrete railway bridges and culverts, 14 new stations, 40 newoverhead road bridges to eliminate all level crossings, construction of a new EMU Depot at Batu Gajah, construction of a 25kV 50Hzoverhead electrification system, full bi-directional signalling, new communications and Automatic Fare Collection systems. In addition to the construction and technical logistics of the project, significant land acquisitions and relocation of squatters were essential pre-requisites. The project was awarded in two packages, an Infrastructure Package and a Systems Package. The Systems Package was awarded to Mitsui Transportation Systems. The owner of the project is Keretapi Tanah Melayu Berhad (KTMB), the Malaysian Railways.
Michael Lawrie MIRSE, GradDip Signalling, Bach Elec/Elect, Bach Bus Department of Transport Victoria Next Generation Signalling is a generic term that is being used in Victoria to describe a new signalling system. It is used is to enable deliberation about the concepts and principles, not about the technology or the supplier systems. It has been adopted to remove any ambiguity that arises when industry specific terms are used. Capacity is a key driver for a deployment of a Next Generation Signalling system. The existing signalling system imposes constraints on the capacity that can be delivered by the infrastructure. The Next Generation Signalling system seeks to address these constraints and enable a higher capacity railway whilst maintaining the high level of safety that the railway enjoys. This paper describes the constraints the existing signalling system imposes on the capacity of the railway and explores how the Next Generation Signalling principles can address these constraints and enable operations at a higher capacity than that traditionally available. Whilst the existing signalling system has served the railway well for almost a hundred years, Next Generation Signalling will offer Victoria significant benefits to capacity and bring Victorian signalling into the modern world.
In this paper, we would like to introduce an innovative proposal based on the research conducted by the Hitachi Rail Innovation team to further improve the existing available tablet application, particularly
This Paper investigates the issues regarding use of passive level crossings for livestock movements in the agricultural industry. This unavoidable practice presents a different risk profile to the typical user, with livestock movement being
I started in signalling more than 30 years ago at British Rail, where I learnt how to design interlockings, initially in relay circuits, and then by programming Solid State Interlockings. This work sparked my interest in safety critical syste
The term signalling principles is often referenced with regards to the design of a signalling system. It is also used as part of the title of a person ‘Principles Verifier’ or ‘Principles Tester’. Some rail managers also reference signalling p
This paper offers a detailed FRMCS integrated migration strategy as a preparatory guide for current GSM-R users, particularly Rail Transport Operators (RTOs), as well as for projects in the planning and developmen
The Public Transport Authority of Western Australia (PTA) is currently building a new mobile radio and backhaul transmission communications network across the Perth metropolitan electrified railway network.
Today’s railway fatalities are arguably more likely to occur at level crossings than in the train collisions we tend to focus most attention on controlling. Designing for level crossing safety can be messy and grey, especially when the dependen
The Netherlands is rolling out the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) across the national network. The government created a Programme Directorate to manage the rollout. Cyber security for both ERTMS as well as the transportation syst
To support the acceptance of safety risk for configuration changes to railways, systems engineering recognises both qualitative and quantitative hazard and risk assessment methods. Quantitative analysis can be perceived as objective and quali
Cybersecurity is a hot topic worldwide with regular attacks being performed against multiple domains.