2024 – March – Zhu, Lauro & Nardi – Innovative Tablet Solution for Improving Rail Operation
Author(s): Dr Bin Zhu, Gianluigi Lauro & Federico Nardi
Date presented:
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Bill Palazzi BEng (Elec) Hons, CEng, MIRSE Rail Section Executive, Australia-Pacific, Parsons Brinckerhoff study to determine the economic benefits and likely success of a new multi-billion dollar standard gauge inland railway between Melbourne and Brisbane. At present, the only north-south rail corridor in eastern Australia runs along the coastline via Sydney. A view has been held by various parties that an inland route through the Central West of NSW has the potential to slash the time it takes to move freight from Melbourne to Brisbane by rail. This would then improve the competitive position of rail transport on this corridor, resulting in a shift of freight from road to rail. This paper has set out the work thus far on the Inland Rail Alignment Study. An overview is provided of the study to date, including the technical and financial/economic aspects, and outlines some of the key considerations and issues. Through a robust and thorough process, the study team has analysed a significant number of different alignments, representing over 50,000 different alternatives between Melbourne and Brisbane, to select two options that represent the most promising alignments. These two options are currently being analysed and refined to determine, in conjunction with the economic and financial analysis, the optimum alignment for the corridor. The final report of the study team will be submitted to the Federal Government in December 2009 and is likely to be published in early 2010.
A.C. Howker The use of the term "Automatic Train Control" (A.T.C.) was, by definition, wrongly named! It was neither truly automatic nor did it totally control trains. However in the historical context, A.T.C. has been the standard description for many years and so the nmenonic is used throughout this brief paper. True A.T.C. has only come into being in the l a s t 20 years and embraces two different principles, namely: A.T.O. - Automatic Train Operation and A.T.P. - Automatic Train Protection. The usage over the past100 years of A.T.C. is really A.T.P., and this is recognised by most railways who now use the more truthful definition, A.W.S. - Automatic Warning System. A.T.C. (or A.W.S.) has been around for a long time. It was recognised early into the Railway Age, that having good signalling (interlocking block) with good brakes (automatic application in the event of train breaking) were still not sufficient to run a truly safe railway. Giving the driver good brakes and presenting him with good signalling was alright, as long as the driver didn't disobey (or miss) the signal indications so the minds of the Great Engineers of the 1880's were put to work to solve t h i s problem. As can be seen, in the early days A.T.C. was only used to apply brakes at a signal showing stop. The different methods devised can be broken down into four methods. 1. Mechanical - empty the train pipe (historically known as train stop method) . 2. Mechanical/Electrical - used contact ramps plus electrical signals. (Most types emptied train pipe - some versions gave audible/vi)rual signals) .
John Aitken BE MlEEE AMIRSE Aitken & Partners Australia has a sad history of incompatibility in railway radio communications. There is no standard for radio communications on the standard gauge track. Some states have incompatible radio systems on different track gauges; one has incompatible radio systems on the standard gauge track. The situation looks likely to continue for many years, imposing a substantial cost on each rail operator. Incompatibility has a further cost to the community, as the Mclnerney inquiry into the Glenbrook rail accident' and the Hexham inquiry2 show. The Hexham inquiry demonstrates that radio system design can affect the susceptibility of a rail network to human error. Ergonomics and equipment failure are regularly considered but there is rarely an analysis of the effects and consequences of human error in the radio communications system design. Some improvement could be gained from expanded Codes of Practice, identifying risks and hazards for consideration at the design and testing stages. Over the last twenty years the mainland railways have moved towards a common frequency band for radio communications. Despite this, sufficient proprietary quirks have been implemented into the radio systems to ensure that no single radio can cover all systems. Locomotives are equipped with up to seven different radios to operate through the Defined lnterstate Railway Network. Recent changes in the cellular telephone market have made the use of GSM-R feasible in Australia. GSM-R could replace incompatible train radio systems in higher traffic areas with internationally standardised equipment. GSM-R is not economical for low traffic areas but can be integrated with existing mobile radio and satellite telephone networks. The paper concludes with a description of an integrated train radio system that was fitted to the CRT Cargosprinter. This is an example of a screen-based radio system that presents a consistent interface to the driver despite variations in radio communication technology along the track.
John Barber Project Manager EB Signals Pty. Ltd. In September, 1990, Queensland Rail awarded a contract to EB Signals for resipalling works associated with duplication of track between Kuraby and Beenleigh and the dual gauging and upgrading of facilities for the Acacia Ridge Freight Project. The contract was awarded with separate completion dates for each portion, these being: i) Acacia Ridge Freight Terminal Project July 31, 1991 ii) Kuraby-Beenleigh Duplication November 30, 1991
K.A. Davis FIRSE, MIEE MEAUST, MACEA Connell Group This paper describes some o f the history and events prior to the implementation o f the Adelaide, signalling project, the main components of the project i.e. Train describer, Passenger fnformation, closed circuit television, public address, signalling and power systems.
Brett Baker, B.E. (Elec), MBA, Project Leadr - ATP, BHP Iron Ore Bill Oberkramer, B.E., Systems Engineer, Harmon Industries The main aims of the railroad of BHPIO is to improve efficiency and safety. The current signal status information as been provided to the driver in the locomotive cab on a continuous basis and the removal of search light signals, also provides distinct maintenance and operational advantages. One of the main features of the system is its Integration with the locomotive electronic air brake system, whereby the ATP system can provide controlled braking applications, overcoming the hazards of only a penalty application. The introduction of ATP, resulting form the success of the Best Practice Demonstration Program, shall provide the Railroad Department of BHPIO with additional safety in an environment where safety is considered with the highest priority.
D.E. Carden New Railway Projects Division Kowloon-Canton Railway CorporationHong Kong, China Today the majority of trains are still driven and controlled by human beings. The advent of train control systems based on continuous track to train and train to track communications, together with automatic train operation and automatic train protection is however changing this situation. Train control systems have taken the level of operating safety to a level previously unknown. These systems when optimised to their ultimate extent, support the concept of Manless operation. This paper reviews the trends in the application of Manless systems worldwide, and takes a holistic view of the concept and in particular where and what in the future will be the role of human beings and computers, to maintain the highest level of safety, in managing and controlling trains, and the commercial viability of building and operating a Manless system. The paper also discusses the various support systems employed in conjunction with the implementation of Manless systems, to maintain a smooth and safe operating environment, as a direct result of the removal of the driver. It explores the advantages and disadvantages of the introduction of Manless operation, and also the perceived problems in accepting Manless trains, by the public at large, and how these problems are in fact unfounded, and how best to dispel the problems. In conclusion Manless operation is now a reality for heavy metro systems. It affords the operator with the opportunity to provide a safe reliable regulated service for its passengers, whilst at the same time allows the rail operator to reap the benefit of reduced life cycle costs, and a more efficient, effective operation.
T. Perry Westinghouse Brake and Signal Company Today, rail transport is faced with the ever-increasing demands for the higher speeds, closer headways and the strict adherence to established schedules, even under inclement weather conditions. Obviously these demands must be met, and in full compliance with safe train operation. To that end WABCO WESTINGHOUSE has developed automatic train control (ATC) systems. With an ATC system, wayside signals are in effect brought into the cab, thus informing the traindriver of the status of the signal blocks ahead and advising him of the maximum speed at which he is permitted to run. The cab signal controls are used in conjunction with a speed determining device to enforce the traindriver's obedience (overspeed protection) to the speed-limit conveyed by the cab signal. Consequently, any failure of the train driver to maintain his train speed results in an automatic brake application.
Mr T. G. Moore, Train Control Systems Manager CityRail Signal Renewal and Modernisation Programme PART A - CONTROL CENTRE ARCHITECTURE AND FUNCTlOlN Mr A. Topfer, Project Engineer Telemetry CityRail Signal Renewal and Modernisation Programme PART B - INTERFACE TO SIGNALLING Mr A. Dwyer, Train Control Systems Engineer CityRail Signal Renewal and Modernisation Programme PART C - SYSTEMS INTERFACE AND GATEWAYS CityRail serves Sydney and a population of 4.6 million people. The CityRail network extends over 150 km from Sydney to the North, South and West. It is intended that this network be controlled from one Control Centre for all Operations and Infrastructure functions. A two step strategy has been adopted to develop the engineering and organisational changes required for the final Control Centre. The CityRail Control Centre at Central will consolidate the operations of signal boxes at Sydney, Strathfield, Sydenham, North Sydney, Hurstville, East Hills, Glenfield, Campbelltown, Liverpool, Sefton, Bankstown, Canterbury, Rhodes, Epping and Thornleigh. Operations Controllers, Mechanical Defects Officers and Passenger Information Officers will also be included in the Control Room. The Control Centre will control over 2,000 train movements daily. The Control Centre will cover 35 signal interlockings and 11 4 stations. The signalling includes 1,900 signals, 400 points and 2,900 track circuits.
Dr. Neil J Robinson, CEng, PhD, CITP, MBCS, BSc(Hons) Head of Systems Assurance, Ansaldo STS. Adjunct Professor, School of Information Technology & Electrical Engineering, The University of Queensland. An organisation's "Safety Culture" is generally defined as "the way we do things round here" with respect to safety. There are several human-factor driven frameworks [5,6,14], available for describing the Safety Culture concept in much more detail. Many of these frameworks define levels of Safety Culture that can be used by organisations as paths for an improvement program. All the definitions of Safety Culture agree that a Safety Culture is more than just a safety management system. It emerges from the systems, practices and people that make up an organisation. But, if having a safety management system, even one that includes controls designed to encourage a good Safety Culture, is not enough to create a good Safety Culture, then what should an organisation do? And specifically, what should a railway signalling organisation do? In this paper we briefly define what is meant by a Safety Culture, with reference to the literature. We review the work that has been done in the UK, Australia and elsewhere on reviewing and improving Safety Cultures in the railway industry, and comment on how that work relates to railway signalling. For example, many railway organisations in Australia have already used the UK RSSB railway Safety Culture toolkit [6] to conduct surveys and report on the maturity of their Safety Culture. We consider how these Safety Culture models apply to engineering of safety-critical systems, and, more specifically, how they apply to railway signal engineering.
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