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Technical Meeting Papers

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2024 – March – Zhu, Lauro & Nardi – Innovative Tablet Solution for Improving Rail Operation
By: Dr Bin Zhu, Gianluigi Lauro & Federico Nardi
Date Presented: March 12th, 2024

In this paper, we would like to introduce an innovative proposal based on the research conducted by the Hitachi Rail Innovation team to further improve the existing available tablet application, particularly


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2024 – March – Sudholz – Passively Active – Warning systems for passive & occupation level crossings in agricultural settings
By: Thomas Sudholz
Date Presented: March 12th, 2024

This Paper investigates the issues regarding use of passive level crossings for livestock movements in the agricultural industry. This unavoidable practice presents a different risk profile to the typical user, with livestock movement being


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2024 – March – Robinson – Barriers to innovation in signalling design, verification, and validation
By: Neil Robinson
Date Presented: March 12th, 2024

I started in signalling more than 30 years ago at British Rail, where I learnt how to design interlockings, initially in relay circuits, and then by programming Solid State Interlockings. This work sparked my interest in safety critical syste


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2024 – March – Moore – Signalling Principles – What are they and where do they come from?
By: Trevor Moore
Date Presented: March 12th, 2024

The term signalling principles is often referenced with regards to the design of a signalling system. It is also used as part of the title of a person ‘Principles Verifier’ or ‘Principles Tester’. Some rail managers also reference signalling p


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2024 – March – Khan & Kamarulzaman – FRMCS – Integrated Migration Strategy
By: Obaid Khan & Khairulzaman Kamarulzaman
Date Presented: March 12th, 2024

This paper offers a detailed FRMCS integrated migration strategy as a preparatory guide for current GSM-R users, particularly Rail Transport Operators (RTOs), as well as for projects in the planning and developmen


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2024 – March – Alvarez – Case Study – FRMCS Migration Path in Perth
By: Rodrigo Alvarez
Date Presented: March 13th, 2024

The Public Transport Authority of Western Australia (PTA) is currently building a new mobile radio and backhaul transmission communications network across the Perth metropolitan electrified railway network. 


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2024 – August – Burns – Human Factors at Level Crossings
By: Peter Burns
Date Presented: August 21st, 2024

Today’s railway fatalities are arguably more likely to occur at level crossings than in the train collisions we tend to focus most attention on controlling. Designing for level crossing safety can be messy and grey, especially when the dependen


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2024 – August – Boss – Human aspects of managing cyber security in delivering ERTMS
By: John Boss
Date Presented: August 21st, 2024

The Netherlands is rolling out the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) across the national network. The government created a Programme Directorate to manage the rollout. Cyber security for both ERTMS as well as the transportation syst


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2022 – November – Youle – Qualitative analysis – the more efficient approach to managing risks SFAIRP
By: Patrick Youle
Date Presented: November 1st, 2022

To support the acceptance of safety risk for configuration changes to railways, systems engineering recognises both qualitative and quantitative hazard and risk assessment methods. Quantitative analysis can be perceived as objective and quali


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2022 – November – Hunter – Cybersecurity in the Railway Industry
By: Hugh Hunter
Date Presented: November 1st, 2022

Cybersecurity is a hot topic worldwide with regular attacks being performed against multiple domains.


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2018 – March – Danton – Delhi Metro Line 7 [Presentation]

Author(s):
Date presented: April 8th, 2018

Julian Danton Bombardier Transportation Delhi Metro is a greenfield development of a 58km heavy metro system with 38 stations and 2 depots, forwhich Bombardier Transportation are currently introducing a CITYFLO 650 communications based traincontrol (CBTC) signalling and control system. The line is a mixture of above ground and tunnel areas,leading to design consideration of system functionalities required to be able to handle operations in eitherenvironment.The vehicles on the line are designed to be operated in both UTO (Unattended Train Operation) and nonUTO modes, both above ground and tunnel. The CBTC system functionalities and integration with therolling stock have therefore been designed to be able to operate with or without a driver across the differentline environments.The introduction of UTO requires a CBTC system with a higher degree of automation, including fullyautomatic depot storage and dispatch, automatic jog and creep at platforms and automatic handling ofemergencies between platforms including evacuation. It also requires increased remote visibility and controlthrough the provision of remote access to onboard CCTV at the OCC (Operational Control Centre) andstations to provide the ability to remotely handle onboard issues for a train in UTO.

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2018 – March – Danton – Delhi Metro Line 7

Author(s):
Date presented: April 8th, 2018

Julian Danton Bombardier Transportation Delhi Metro is a greenfield development of a 58km heavy metro system with 38 stations and 2 depots, forwhich Bombardier Transportation are currently introducing a CITYFLO 650 communications based traincontrol (CBTC) signalling and control system. The line is a mixture of above ground and tunnel areas,leading to design consideration of system functionalities required to be able to handle operations in eitherenvironment.The vehicles on the line are designed to be operated in both UTO (Unattended Train Operation) and nonUTO modes, both above ground and tunnel. The CBTC system functionalities and integration with therolling stock have therefore been designed to be able to operate with or without a driver across the differentline environments.The introduction of UTO requires a CBTC system with a higher degree of automation, including fullyautomatic depot storage and dispatch, automatic jog and creep at platforms and automatic handling ofemergencies between platforms including evacuation. It also requires increased remote visibility and controlthrough the provision of remote access to onboard CCTV at the OCC (Operational Control Centre) andstations to provide the ability to remotely handle onboard issues for a train in UTO.

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2018 – March – Hunter/Joseph – Use of Independent Safety Assessment on Railway Projects [Presentation]

Author(s):
Date presented: April 8th, 2018

Hugh Hunter Certifier Australia Serge Joseph French and Algerian Ministry of Transport Regulation of Australian Railways in standardised across Australia and is administered by the Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator (ONRSR).The ONRSR Major Project Guidelines [21] states that ONRSR expects major projects to engage an Independent Safety Assessor who:• Is independent from the delivery organisations• Resources the project based on the scale and complexity of the task• Use Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) with an appropriate mix of competency, qualifications and relevantexperience for the project scopeState government organisations such as Transport for New South Wales (TfNSW) state in their Guide to IndependentSafety Assessment [17], that new or altered assets requiring “safety significant changes” should be subjected toIndependent Safety Assessment (InSA).There is a general lack of understanding in the railway industry regarding areas such as:• What is Independent Safety Assessment, why is it performed and what is its role in a project• The types of independent assessments that are required to be performed for the fulfillment of differentregulations and standards. This includes the usage of multiple assessment types within a project.• Can any safety assurance body perform independent safety assessments or do these entities have to beaccredited to perform their various independent assessment types?• Who performs the accreditation of an ISA and how is this accreditation recognised in different states andcountries.• Where in the project lifecycle does the ISA become involved?• How much of a project does the ISA assess, and how does the ISA ensure that the InSA provides a suitablefocus on the areas of higher risk• How does the ISA work together with the project with regards to observation management and the generationof ISA reports?• What does the ISA expect the project team to provide for assessment?• What are the tools and techniques utilised by an ISA• The usage of multiple ISAs in project and how an ISA can accept the results provided by other ISAs.This paper addresses this lack of understanding, providing descriptions of the different independent assessment types,detailing the role of the ISA, describing the InSA process, and describing the use of accreditation for an ISA and how thisaccreditation is recognised throughout the world.

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2018 – March – Hunter/Joseph – Use of Independent Safety Assessment on Railway Projects

Author(s):
Date presented: April 8th, 2018

Hugh Hunter Certifier Australia Serge Joseph French and Algerian Ministry of Transport Regulation of Australian Railways in standardised across Australia and is administered by the Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator (ONRSR).The ONRSR Major Project Guidelines [21] states that ONRSR expects major projects to engage an Independent Safety Assessor who:• Is independent from the delivery organisations• Resources the project based on the scale and complexity of the task• Use Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) with an appropriate mix of competency, qualifications and relevantexperience for the project scopeState government organisations such as Transport for New South Wales (TfNSW) state in their Guide to IndependentSafety Assessment [17], that new or altered assets requiring “safety significant changes” should be subjected toIndependent Safety Assessment (InSA).There is a general lack of understanding in the railway industry regarding areas such as:• What is Independent Safety Assessment, why is it performed and what is its role in a project• The types of independent assessments that are required to be performed for the fulfillment of differentregulations and standards. This includes the usage of multiple assessment types within a project.• Can any safety assurance body perform independent safety assessments or do these entities have to beaccredited to perform their various independent assessment types?• Who performs the accreditation of an ISA and how is this accreditation recognised in different states andcountries.• Where in the project lifecycle does the ISA become involved?• How much of a project does the ISA assess, and how does the ISA ensure that the InSA provides a suitablefocus on the areas of higher risk• How does the ISA work together with the project with regards to observation management and the generationof ISA reports?• What does the ISA expect the project team to provide for assessment?• What are the tools and techniques utilised by an ISA• The usage of multiple ISAs in project and how an ISA can accept the results provided by other ISAs.This paper addresses this lack of understanding, providing descriptions of the different independent assessment types,detailing the role of the ISA, describing the InSA process, and describing the use of accreditation for an ISA and how thisaccreditation is recognised throughout the world.

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2018 – March – Ness – MMRA Presentation

Author(s):
Date presented: April 8th, 2018

David Ness MMRA Rail Systems Alliance Package Director The Owners Persepective - details of the complexity of the project

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2018 – March – Tattersall – Opening Presentation

Author(s):
Date presented: April 8th, 2018

Evan Tattersall CEO Melbourne Metro Rail Authority Transforming Victiorias Rail Network - Presentation

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2017 – July – Wimberley – Cyber Security in a Heavy Haul Railway

Author(s):
Date presented: July 18th, 2017

Jeff Wimberley BE, Associate Member IRSE Aurizon PTY LTD As technology changes, modern railway signalling systems are becoming more and more reliant on IP Data networks for both their day to day operation as well as for their supportability. For example we now have processor based interlockings at one end of a yard being connected to object controllers at the other end of the yard using IP based data networks. We also have a need to remotely access interlockings and associated systems such as axle counters as well as the data network elements from a central location or a location remote to the organisation to monitor and maintain service of these systems. Whilst all of this takes a level of discipline and rigour to implement, it can also provide a less than secure pathway for an unauthorised person to gain access to the systems if Cyber Security considerations are ignored. This paper will discuss Aurizon’s recognition of the Cyber Security threat to the company as a whole and the signalling system in particular and what has been done to reduce the risks for both.

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2017 – July – Nardi and Revell – Migration methodologies for CBTC and ERTMS

Author(s):
Date presented: July 18th, 2017

Federico Nardi BCompE (Hons), RE(OIGenova) Ansaldo STS Australia Pty Ltd Howard Revell BA, CEng, RPE (Elec), RPEQ (Elec), HonFIRSE MIEEE
 Ansaldo STS Australia Pty Ltd This paper focuses on the differing aspects of the migration processes and methods involved in transforming existing legacy metro and mainline signalling systems over to CBTC or ERTMS based systems. Three of Ansaldo STS’s current European brownfield projects have been selected to provide scenarios, with each scenario offering a specific approach to a migration methodology that satisfies the particular nature of the project and the needs of the customer organisation funding the project. The three scenarios relate to three different customer organisations: Stockholm Metro Red Line - CBTC for Storstockholms Lokaltrafik (SL) 
 Haparandabanan, part of the ESTER Project - ERTMS L2 for Trafikverket 
 Florence – Rome HSL upgrade - ERTMS L2 for Rete Ferroviaria Italiana (RFI. 
These scenarios provide a useful background concerning the need for effective system planning to support efficient design and implementation tasks, without causing disruption to revenue service traffic. However, despite this approach being very well established and practiced in our industry, it is very costly in terms of time, effort and funds and perhaps there is an alternative migration mitigation approach that could be investigated and adopted. These scenarios raise a number of points that may be usefully heeded by others involved in similar migration projects.

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2017 – July – Banerjee – Monologue of a Byte by Byte traveller

Author(s):
Date presented: July 18th, 2017

Somnath Banerjee B. Tech, FIRSE, MIEEE, MIRSTE, RPEQ The history of “Byte by Byte” Railway signalling is also the history of new technology for Railway Signalling.  Any discussion on this subject will remain incomplete unless we know how to manage new technology bite by bite. The introduction of new technology in Railway Signalling systems, more often than not, is a challenging exercise. This assumes significant importance because compared to the investment and its physical visibility its impact is very high. This paper discusses how the challenges can be managed in a structured manner. Some important steps can help reduce the labour pains of introduction of new technology in a Railway signalling system.     .    a)  Clear understanding of the operator’s need for the new technology. 
    .    b)  Choosing the right technology to match the operator’s expectations . 
    .    c)  Structuring the development to match the operator requirements using several independent blocks. This is 
again an important step and if not thought out properly, it can make changes to the design difficult and costly. 
    .    d)  Designing the sub-systems with enough resilience to allow with minimum effects to other sub-systems. 
    .    e)  A strategy for testing the sub-systems to ensure minimum changes to it once the sub-systems are integrated into a single system

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2017 – July – Burns – Electronic virtual trainstops

Author(s):
Date presented: July 18th, 2017

Peter Burns MBA, BAppSci (Elect), FIRSE, CPEng, FIEAust PYB Consulting As signalling technology moves from the world of the fixed signal to the world of Communication Based systems, one major issue which arises is how to deal with the legacy unfitted train. Traditionally, the available answers to that issue have been:     •    Don’t allow non-fitted trains to run on the relevant part of the network (the captive fleet option); or 
    •    Build the Communications based System as an overlay on traditional signalling infrastructure including its 
fixed signals. 
This second option in particular denies the railway any of the cost benefits associated with the new technology and acts as a barrier to its use. 
This paper will explore the alternative – to make the signalling for the unfitted train an overlay on the underlying Communication Based Signalling, rather than the other way around. 
The method for doing this will be explored via the example of the Electronic Virtual Trainstop. We do not have one of these right now, but we are in a position to develop its specification. 
In a world where the signal engineer has involvement in defining the train’s on-board systems, this paper will explore three specific subsystems and the interfaces between them needed to achieve operability. One subsystem is part of the infrastructure, associated with the communications based signalling itself. The second is conceptually portable, but operationally part of the equipment taken on board the train. The third is the electronic virtual trainstop itself – the core on-board system. 
The issue with defining an on-board system for an unfitted train seems apparent just looking at the terms. In reality, “lack of fitment” covers a range of possibilities, ranging from no fitment whatsoever, through a very basic system-independent facility (here we find the Electronic Virtual Trainstop) to a train fully fitted with somebody else’s Communication Based signalling. Each possibility will be discussed. 
By defining the intermediate system and some basic open interfaces, the paper will show how the issue of interoperability can be managed for the full range of possible trains.

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