1979 – July – Leclercq – Pulse Code Modulator Systems for Telephone Tru
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In this paper, we would like to introduce an innovative proposal based on the research conducted by the Hitachi Rail Innovation team to further improve the existing available tablet application, particularly
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FA Rylands AMIE (Aust) New South Wales Railways I intend, tonight, to talk about the various items that go to make up a complete carrier telephone installation.
AJ Metcalfe MIRSE DML Engineering (QLD) Pty Ltd in the intervening years between the two world wars C.T.C. systems were developed, basically as we know them today, giving all the advantages of secure block sections combined with the concept of overall control by one operator of a complete section of line as in the train order system. C.T.C. systems have one major disadvantage to modern railway administration, and that is the relatively high cost and generally, the continued use of many hundreds of kilometres of pole line which is expensive to maintain. In my talk today I would like to firstly consider how the cost of C.T.C. schemes for the more major routes could be reduced without losing integrity or flexibility of the system and then continue to low cost alternatives to obsolescent and labour intensive systems used on low density traffic lines.
Ken Davis Recent cl.ianges to customer focussed orgaliisational structures has resulted in engineering, including railway signal and telecommuriications engineering, as being regarded as "services" to the owners and operators of railways. Ilow can we (railway engineering departments and industry suppliers) as "service" providers demonstrate to our customers that wc can be "trusted" to deliver safe and appropriately functional railway signalling and telecommunications systems. Currently, goverllmellt owned railways have their own engineering departments which specify, approve, certify etc the deliverablcs from industry suppliers, and by default, are "trusted" by the owners and operators. With railways focussing more on the bottom line, more and more engineering services are being outsourced, either resulting in staff rationalisations or resistance to staff increases to compensate for increased workload. This consequently impacts on the ability of engineering departments to perform these functions and therefore has an impact on this "trust". Reliance on past performance as the only evidence is not necessarily a reliable indicator if the service offered involves some novelty eg unusual requirements, high technology etc. How can we as suppliers of safety-related services demonstrate to our customer that they can "trust" us?