1997 – July – Luber – Track Vacancy Detection Equipment Using Axle Counter
Author(s):
Date presented:
Brian Luber Sales Manager Transportation Systems Siemens Ltd Australia
Technical Meeting Papers
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202503 – Afshar – CBTC Signalling System & Emerging Technologies; AI, Machine Learning & Crowd Computing for Adaptive Real-Time Train Timetables
By: Parisa Afshar
Date Presented: March 21st, 2025
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202503 – Li – Competency Management in the Australian Railway Signalling Industry
By: Daniel Li
Date Presented: March 21st, 2025
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202503 – Moore – Signal Design Report: What Is It and Why Do We Need It?
By: Trevor Moore
Date Presented: March 21st, 2025
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202503 – Sudholz – Break of Gauge: Competencies in the Australian Signalling Project Environment
By: Thomas Sudholz
Date Presented: March 21st, 2025
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202503 – Turner – Growing Graduates in the Sun: 30 Years of Signalling Graduate Development in Queensland Rail
By: Blake Turner
Date Presented: March 21st, 2025
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202503 – Villegas – The Importance of Operation and Maintenance Concepts in the Delivery and Operation of Rail Networks
By: Selena Villegas
Date Presented: March 21st, 2025
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2004 – July – Modernisation of KTMB’s Signalling & Telecommunication Systems
Date Presented: October 20th, 2024
The total route length of KTMB’s network amounts to approximately 1670 km and is mainly single track except for about 150 km of electrified double track sections around the capital city, Kuala Lumpur, for commuter services.
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1998 – July – Skilton – Tranz Rail’s National Train Control Centre
By: JT Skilton
Date Presented: October 20th, 2024
JT Skilton Signalling systems within Tranz Rail which require control from a remote location can be classified into three types, Centralised Traffic Control (CTC), remote controlled interlockings in Track Warrant (TW) territory and remote controlled interlockings embedded in Double Line Automatic (DLA) signalling. The CTC systems control the movement of trains in both directions over a single line section divided up into block sections and crossing loops. A field unit is installed at each crossing loop for the purpose of communicating with the control centre. TW control requires all trains to hold a warrant for the section of line being traversed. This warrant is issued to the locomotive engineer verbally over the train radio system and checked for correct reception by reading back over the radio system to the control centre. A selected number of crossing loops within TW territory are fully interlocked and equipped with a field unit which allows the Train Control Operator (TCO) to have full control over motor points and signals. Centralised control of interlockings in DLA territory is used where junctions between main and branch lines occur. Central control is used for movements to and from the branch line and, although it can also be used for signalling along the main lines, the interlocking can be switched to automatic for main line movements.
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1998 – July – McDonald – Today’s Interlocking – A World of Applications
By: Wayne McDonald
Date Presented: October 20th, 2024
Wayne McDonald Computer based interlockings today must be adaptable to the vastly different environments found in the many rail networks throughout the world. This paper overviews some of these environments where one such system, WESTRACE, has been installed and it highlights some of the special requirements essential to suit those locations.
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1997 – November – Brock, Ebzery & McMurtrie – Homebush Bay Rail Link – Signalling Design and Management
By: Peter Brock, Frank Ebzery & Bruce McMurtrie
Date Presented: October 20th, 2024
Peter Brock, Frank Ebzery & Bruce McMurtrie The construction of the Year 2000 Olympic facilities and the relocation of the Royal Agricultural Show Grounds Homebush Bay requires the construction of a high capacity transport link. Heavy rail is the only transport system that will supply the required capacity. The new Homebush Bay rail Loop will connect Olympic Park and the new Homebush Bay Showgrounds with the rest of the Sydney metropolitan rail networkTrail loop is nearing completion and will be commissioned on the 22/23 November 1997.
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1989 – July – Blakeley-Smith – ATCS – The Universal Signalling System?
Author(s):
Date presented:
Andrew Blakeley-Smith MIRSE Systems Consultant Teknis International Railroad Systems "Signalling" to the average communications engineer normally means the process by means of which a telephone or data call is established, monitored and then cleared down between two or more parties. Any thought that there should be radical differences in procedures or basic philosophies that prevent or even make difficult this ojective is almost a contradiction of the requirement to communicate in the first place. We thus now have a world wide communications network in which a telephone call can be placed anywhere and without too much difficulty, at least in principle, end up in the right place. This has been achieved by specifying the interface points of the various telephone networks, at a United Nations level, to be compatible in terms of signalling information, levels and frequency allocations etc. A spin-off from this has been that many of the indiv'dual items of hardware kave become interchangeable - even if the packaging is not identical and thus a walk through a telephone exchange will reveal a veritable United Nations of equipment happily CO-existing for most of the time. Aircraft also need to communicate but unlike telephone exchanges also move around, thus when a piece of hardware fails a long way from home base, not only must the replacement meet the same electrical interfaces but it must also fit in the same hole as the failed equipment. Thus from the Communications and aircraft industries has developed a modular way of specifying and building complex systems on a "Form Fit Function" basis. ATCS - the Advanced Train Control System - has grown out of the objectives of the use of the appropriate design philosophies to use widely available hardware elements to produce a signalling system which is multisourced and facilitates all operational and maintenance aspects of interworking between the railroads in the USA and Canada. The specification documents for such a system are formidable and take up as much space as several telephone directories, it is not the intent of this paper to give a comprehensive summary of this documentation but to illustrate some of the more interesting elements in the design.
2004 – July – Traffic Management System – ILTIS
Author(s):
Date presented:
ILTIS is a traffic-management system (TMS) which integrates all the essential functions required for the management of a railway network. Its main focus is to simplify all aspects of railway management (from ergonomic operator input to the optimization of the track reserveration periods), resulting in a consistent level of punctuality with train services. As ILTIS was conceived from the beginning as a totally integrated system (and not as a loosely coupled collection of independent systems), there is a great synergy between all of its components. An integrated system also benefits from the simplification of a control center's infrastructure and significantly reduces operating and maintenance costs. ILTIS consists of a network of several computers, which can be tailored to satisfy each customer's individual requirements. It provides a 24 x 7 service with a built-in redundancy that avoids system outages due to hardware faults that may occur.
1987 – Nov – Clarke – Aberdeen – Werris Creek CTC – The Project
Author(s):
Date presented:
J.R. Clarke S.R.A. Although the obvious benefits of a C.T.C. type signalling system are well know, the documented, I feel it was with some misgivings that Executive of the S.R.A finally gave their blessing to the awarding of an approved contract. I base this statement of a number of items which have come to light :- 1. The Executive was somewhat alarmed at the number of failures which initially occurred on the North Coast C.T.C. 2. The susceptibility of the electronic equipment to lightning strike. and 3. The overrun in time and funding which occured on North Coast C.T.C. In November 1984 the submission for approval was submitted with the following documentary evidence of performance. 1. Staff Savings: North Coast C.T.C. 195 individuals Junee Albury C.T.C. 46 individuals
1995 – Nov – Nikandros – Trusted Suppliers
Author(s):
Date presented:
G P Nikandros FIRSE Safety is fundamental to a railway business. Railway signalling and telecommunications are very important elements in the systems used for the safe working of trains and consequently have a significant safety role. It is therefore important that railway signalling and telecommunications systems are designed, constructed, tested and maintained so as to provide the level of safety expected by the public, the rail industry and regulatory authorities.
1995 – March – Talbot – Safety & Quality for Railways
Author(s):
Date presented:
W. Talbot Major rail operations safety incidents such as collisions can be reduced, using railway signalling technology, by controlling the speed and spacing of trains. This provides the essential safety engineering system. The installed signalling system will only provide it's safe control functions if their built-in fail safe properties are continuously monitored and maintained at predetermined and measurable levels of reliable performance. The operations safety and engineering reliability requirements can be achieved by the implementation of quality assurance systems which are focused on the signalling system which are vital to the maintenance of the operating system. Quality assurance systems provide a methodology for the undertaking of work practices to a standard. Quality systems are employed to ensure routine work practices are carried out consistently and to a procedure but how does this apply to safety and safety systems used in the ranway industry and in particular signalling. In this paper we explore the statement "Safety is the Quality Imperative for Signalling" and what it means to the development of quality systems, with some helpful hints towards developing a quality system.
1995 – Nov – Wardrop – Train Performance & Train Modelling as an Aide to Signal Design
Author(s):
Date presented:
Alex Wardrop TMG International Pty Ltd
1998 – March – Duffy, Donald & Huth – Partnering in Practice
Author(s):
Date presented:
Mike Duffy MIRSE Queensland RailMike Donald MIRSE Westinghouse Signals AustraliaPaul Huth AMIRSE Queensland Rail This paper reviews the key elements, processes, problems and opportunities which face both the client and supplier as they move from the more traditional but adversarial contract only arrangement to a more open non adversarial arrangement facilitated by Partnering.
1986 – March – Londregan – Electrification of the Illawarra Railway
Author(s):
Date presented:
James Londregan This Project was conceived during the latter part of 1982, and a consortium comprising Gutheridge, Haskins, Davey combined with the Transmark to manage and prepare Specification for all stages of the Project encompassing the three Engineering Branches.
1993 – Nov – Royle – Safety Auditing of Railway Signalling Systems
Author(s):
Date presented:
GREGORY W.R. ROYLE Manager Trusted Systems Computer Sciences of Australia Pty Ltd Safety Auditing is an engineering activity which has arisen from requirements for the development of so-called "safety-critical systems". A safety-critical system is one in which a failure or design implementation error could cause risk to human life; it requires the highest level of safety integrity. Clearly, a railway signalling system fits this definition. The term "safety auditing" is introduced in the UK Defence Standards 00-55 and 00-56 (References 1 and 2). In these standards, an Independent Safety Auditor (ISA) has a role of assessing the safety of the overall system in a way which is free from any conflicts of interest. This role is referred to as an "Assessor" in other relevant standards such as IEC 65a (Reference 3) and FUA Spec. 23 (Reference 4). Safety-critical systems must be developed in a way which ensures that the risk to human life during operation of the system is acceptably low. This is achieved by establishing a Safety Program to operate throughout the system's development. A Safety Program comprises three main elements: safety program management safety analysis safety verification and validation (V&V). Safety analysis involves hazard analysis, hazard tracking, risk assessment and hazard resolution. Safety V&V involves the use of personnel who are not involved in other aspects of the project to perform checking and testing of the safety elements of the systems development against the system specification and progressive specifications and design documents. Safety Program Management involves the organisation, planning, monitoring and review of all safety activities to ensure that they are performed satisfactorily. The role of the ISA is part of the Safety Program Management. Although the Safety Program is identified as a separate element, it is part of the overall system development process. As such, it interfaces into, and works in conjunction with, other activities in: project management system engineering (including software and hardware engineering) system verification and validation. As such, an important element of safety Program Management is ensuring effective integration of the safety engineering activities with the other system engineering activities, yet maintaining a focus on the safety issues to ensure that the safety objectives are not compromised.