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In this paper, we would like to introduce an innovative proposal based on the research conducted by the Hitachi Rail Innovation team to further improve the existing available tablet application, particularly
This Paper investigates the issues regarding use of passive level crossings for livestock movements in the agricultural industry. This unavoidable practice presents a different risk profile to the typical user, with livestock movement being
I started in signalling more than 30 years ago at British Rail, where I learnt how to design interlockings, initially in relay circuits, and then by programming Solid State Interlockings. This work sparked my interest in safety critical syste
The term signalling principles is often referenced with regards to the design of a signalling system. It is also used as part of the title of a person ‘Principles Verifier’ or ‘Principles Tester’. Some rail managers also reference signalling p
This paper offers a detailed FRMCS integrated migration strategy as a preparatory guide for current GSM-R users, particularly Rail Transport Operators (RTOs), as well as for projects in the planning and developmen
The Public Transport Authority of Western Australia (PTA) is currently building a new mobile radio and backhaul transmission communications network across the Perth metropolitan electrified railway network.
Today’s railway fatalities are arguably more likely to occur at level crossings than in the train collisions we tend to focus most attention on controlling. Designing for level crossing safety can be messy and grey, especially when the dependen
The Netherlands is rolling out the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) across the national network. The government created a Programme Directorate to manage the rollout. Cyber security for both ERTMS as well as the transportation syst
To support the acceptance of safety risk for configuration changes to railways, systems engineering recognises both qualitative and quantitative hazard and risk assessment methods. Quantitative analysis can be perceived as objective and quali
Cybersecurity is a hot topic worldwide with regular attacks being performed against multiple domains.
James Londregan This Project was conceived during the latter part of 1982, and a consortium comprising Gutheridge, Haskins, Davey combined with the Transmark to manage and prepare Specification for all stages of the Project encompassing the three Engineering Branches.
D CORRIE CEng FlEE FlRSE First Presented at the IEE, Savoy Place, London Look ahead some 25 years: what do you think railways will be like? Recently, many railways have been carrying their largest amount of traffic ever, yet they still have a falling market share, and this shows that society still requires transport to support its economic activities. Much transport depends on oil, a diminishing resource. Rail transport can provide fuel efficiency on trunk routes and electrified railways are less dependent on oil fuel. It is my opinion that railways have much to offer to society in the coming decades. The degree to which railways will achieve such support of society's economic activity depends on two things: an ability to attract investment and an ability to deliver a valued service. For both of these to be achieved railways must improve, both their performance and their image. This improvement depends greatly on control and communication.
Eugene Broderick GradDipRailSig AMIRSE Laing O’Rourke Australia Stephen Lemon MSc MIEAust CPEng RPEQ MIRSE Laing O’Rourke Australia The Docklands Light Railway (DLR) in London opened in 1987 with an ATP/ATO signalling and control system, with no mainline signals, and technology that included VDU-based train control, SSI interlockings, reed RT-type track circuits, and audio frequencies injected into the running rails and cable loops, to provide 'authority to proceed' and 'speed monitoring' functionality respectively. As a result of the need to increase the capacity of the railway, both in terms of the geographical area covered and the throughput of trains, a new ATP/ATO system was introduced during the mid 1990s, based around moving-block Communications-Based Train Control (CBTC) technology. The signalling and control functionality of this CBTC system relied upon continuous data communication between the trains and centralised interlocking and control systems via a series of trackside loop cables, supported by an underlying system of axle counters. The moving-block system was first implemented on a new extension to the railway, and subsequently as a replacement for the existing fixed block system on the entire railway, and it has been subject to a number of major and minor upgrades to the equipment and software since that time. From the early days of the DLR, there were issues associated with the operation and maintenance of the signalling, control and communications systems, which were predominantly electronic and software-based, at a time when the experience of staff in the UK rail signalling industry was largely based around more prevalent mechanical and electrical systems. With the transition to a more complex CBTC system, the technical and operational issues were compounded. In particular, the ongoing upgrades to the system required robust processes to manage the impact of changes, with a focus on strict configuration control, systems assurance and approval.
John Hall Australian Rail Track Corporation The primary purpose of the NTCS project is to provide a cost efficient, effective and interoperable Train Control communications network to support the current train control requirements and also future proof ARTC by providing a reliable high speed data platform to support the data intensive train management control system being planned for the future. The National Train Communications System is designed to replace the many disparate and old communications systems, of which ARTC is required to maintain and support for Train Control operations. The NTCS project will provide 704 ICE (in-Cabin Equipment) units for rail operators to install into their Locomotives that will operate across ARTC and adjacent controlled rail networks on Telstra's NextG™ mobile network. Telstra will provide an additional 78 radio sites along the rail corridor comprising of 62 Macro base stations and 16 radio fitted tunnels. The Telstra NextG™ network will provide a single network for communication between Locomotives, Train Control, Track side workers and wayside equipment. This seamless coverage will be backed up by a secondary communications platform provided by the Iridium Satellite network. The NTCS solution will provide for routine and emergency communications across ARTC and non ARTC train control territories, which ARTC has engaged Telstra as the primary contractor to design, construct and maintain the National Train Communication system.
GREGORY W.R. ROYLE Manager Trusted Systems Computer Sciences of Australia Pty Ltd Safety Auditing is an engineering activity which has arisen from requirements for the development of so-called "safety-critical systems". A safety-critical system is one in which a failure or design implementation error could cause risk to human life; it requires the highest level of safety integrity. Clearly, a railway signalling system fits this definition. The term "safety auditing" is introduced in the UK Defence Standards 00-55 and 00-56 (References 1 and 2). In these standards, an Independent Safety Auditor (ISA) has a role of assessing the safety of the overall system in a way which is free from any conflicts of interest. This role is referred to as an "Assessor" in other relevant standards such as IEC 65a (Reference 3) and FUA Spec. 23 (Reference 4). Safety-critical systems must be developed in a way which ensures that the risk to human life during operation of the system is acceptably low. This is achieved by establishing a Safety Program to operate throughout the system's development. A Safety Program comprises three main elements: safety program management safety analysis safety verification and validation (V&V). Safety analysis involves hazard analysis, hazard tracking, risk assessment and hazard resolution. Safety V&V involves the use of personnel who are not involved in other aspects of the project to perform checking and testing of the safety elements of the systems development against the system specification and progressive specifications and design documents. Safety Program Management involves the organisation, planning, monitoring and review of all safety activities to ensure that they are performed satisfactorily. The role of the ISA is part of the Safety Program Management. Although the Safety Program is identified as a separate element, it is part of the overall system development process. As such, it interfaces into, and works in conjunction with, other activities in: project management system engineering (including software and hardware engineering) system verification and validation. As such, an important element of safety Program Management is ensuring effective integration of the safety engineering activities with the other system engineering activities, yet maintaining a focus on the safety issues to ensure that the safety objectives are not compromised.
A.U. Wishnia A. Dip. EE. The 64 seater Glenelg trams have conveyed people over the 11 kilometres of track between Adelaide and the seaside resort of Glenelg for over half a century. The city office and dep6t of the Metropolitan Tramways Trust was opened for operation at Victoria Square on the 4th of April 1917. The city depot commenced operations on the 11th December 1923 with 11 tramway bays and an additional eight tracks were subsequently added. The administrative offices were opened on the Victoria Square facade on the 6th of May 1933. This depot was used to house 30 fuel buses back in 1965, giving it a dual operational role. The city depot remained this way until the new Tram Depot was opened at Glengowrie in 1986 when all the maintenance and operations associated with the trams moved to take up residence in its present modern environment. The old depot at Victoria Square is prime real estate and its sale will be used to offset the cost of constructing the new depot. Having made the decision to relocate, the final consideration was the method of controlling movements into and out of the depot. The old method in the city was simple. Spring operated switches and handles :ie manual operation. The final solution adopted was considerably more complex at Glengowrie. This was due to the problems introduced by the level crossings at Morphett Road and Maxwell Terrace and main line speeds allowed in this area. Several alternatives for operating the depot were considered but the one chosen was a remote automatic route selection system. This system was required to automatically select the main line routes in the absence of an instruction to the contrary from a tram and to set up a route which would enable trams to enter or leave the depot upon receipt of a signal from the tram. It should be noted that most service movements over the area are main line movements and it is only necessary to make a request to alter the road when leaving or entering the depot. Also, operation from a central or local control panel was rejected due to traffic requirements and operation into and out of the depot was to be achieved from the tram. It is for these reasons that an automatic main line selection is made after every tram has completed its movement.
C. L. TURNER. B.ENG. MlRSC MIE AUST Manager Communlcat ions Perth Urban Rail Electrif lcation Project One of the more important issues that a transport organisation must investigate prior to electrifying a railway suste is that of communications. Is the existing communications system capabale of working beside and fulfilling the requirements of the electric, railway? If not, which system design should be chosen to satisfy the requirements? The questions and many other issues confronted the Perth Urban Rail Electrification Project (PUREP) team during the preparation of the 1986 Master plan which was the result of a feasibility study conducted by the above team consisting of specialist staff from Westrail and MMPE. In February 1988 the Government of Western Australia granted approval for the project to proceed within the scope of the Master Plan 1988 the Government granted approval to build a new electrified railway line through the burgeoning northern suburbs to Joondalup. At the time of writing this paper, approximately 10% of the communications field works associated with the electrification of the existing system were complete. With respect to the Joondalup extension, design works were in the preliminary stages. This paper outlines the existing communications system, the reasons for change, the chosen designs and describes associated new facilities.
Luis Sanchez Bach of Electronic Eng (HON), MIEAUST Public Transport Authority of Western Australia The PTAWA (Public Transport Authority of Western Australia) introduced the Ansaldo L10,000 ATP system (also known as ATC1 or EBICAB) into its rail network in 1990/1991. From the beginning, a point of contention between the PTA and its contractors has been the positioning of ATP Update Transponders. The number and placement of transponders required to minimise the "delay effects" caused by the use of discrete information points as "infill", or the need for updates at all, will be examined. This paper will demonstrate the different methods used by the PTAWA to determine the positioning and number of ATP Update Transponders between signals. The use of Update Transponders as "Infill" seems also to be losing favour in the signalling world due to the perceived delay effects caused by intermittent systems. A new method of determining Update Transponder positioning is proposed which demonstrates that intermittent systems can provide good performance at a reasonable cost. Most of this document and calculations assume the use of the Ansaldo L10,000 system as installed in the PTA. Many of the concepts and ideas may be directly translated to other intermittent ATP systems such as ETCS level 1.
Ian Lowe BAppSc, DipEd, BE, GradDipMan, GradCerRiskMan US&S Pty Ltd The aim of this paper is to promote discussion regarding the ability of existing S&T organisations to adopt and implement new and emerging technologies and strategies, given the history and conservative nature of the S&T industry. The paper focuses on the attributes of the engineers within the S&T organisations and how those personal attributes have been developed. It provides a brief review of past and present personnel development opportunities that are available to engineers. Finally, it presents a scenario for future system requirements and discusses how those requirements can be met through personnel development.
Dr. Holger M Becht PhD, BInfTech(Hons) Safety & RAM Manager; Ansaldo STS, Brisbane In virtually all safety-critical industries the operators of systems have to demonstrate a systematic and thorough consideration of safety. This is generally done through the application of safety standards as part of the development of safety critical systems. Many safety assurance standards (like EN50126 [1], IEC 61508 [8], DEF (Aust) 5679) [6] are very prescriptive. They require specific techniques, approaches or measures to be applied to achieve the safety objective without allowing the users to select a suite of techniques and measures best suited for their application and development environment. The application of prescriptive techniques can work well for some systems but can be a hindrance for others. There has therefore been an increasing trend in many industries to demonstrate safety by assuring certain goals have been achieved, rather than simply following prescriptive standards. Goal-based standards do not specify the means of achieving compliance but sets goals that allow for alternative ways of achieving compliance. Goal-based safety standards are now a reality and applied in the medical industry and defence; examples of such standards are the UK Defence Standard 00-56 [5], and the UK Railway Safety Standard The Yellow Book [11].